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“CHINA’S FOOD INDUSTRY IN CRISIS: A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE FSL AND
CHINA’S ENFORCEMENT OBSTACLES”

INA ILIN-SCHNEIDER

Introduction
"Food is essential, and safety should be a top priority. Food safety
is closely related to people's lives and health, economic
development and social harmony. We must create a food safety
system of self-disciplined food companies with integrity, effective
government supervision and broad public support to improve
overall food safety."
Premier Li Keqiang, Head of the National Food Safety
Commission, State Council, People Republic of China.1
Melamine contaminated milk, toxic bean sprouts, aluminum dumplings, glow-in-the-dark
pork, gutter oil, cadmium rice, toxic preserved fruits, fluorescent bleached mushrooms, fake eggs
and the list goes on and on – this has been the sad reality of the Chinese food industry for the
past several years.2 Millions of Chinese citizens are paralyzed with fear of another food safety
scare and doubt about the quality and safety of their next meal. More and more parents and
caretakers around China are justifiably concerned about feeding their infants baby formula
produced in China. Public trust in the Chinese food industry, especially in recent years, has been
continuously dwindling, prompting officials to step up their efforts of improving overall food
safety.
1

Vice premier orders efforts to improve food safety, CHINADAILY, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/201004/20/content_9749703.htm (last updated Apr. 20, 2010).
2
Yanzhong Huang, China's Corrupt Food Chain, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/18/opinion/chinas-corrupt-food-chain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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Following the devastating incident in 2008 involving melamine contaminated baby
formula, which killed six infants and sickened more than three hundred thousand others,3 the
National People’s Congress (“NPC”) felt the public pressure to develop a comprehensive plan,
which culminated in the passing of the 2009 Food Safety Law (“FSL”). 4 The new piece of
legislation aimed to prevent and resolve future incidences of food safety violations. It was an
attempt to restore the reputation and the public trust in the Chinese food industry.
This article argues that the enactment of the FSL has several significant implications for
the Chinese food industry. First, the FSL creates a national monitoring system for food safety
risks to monitor incidents of food contamination and imposes a mandate on the central and local
government agencies to formulate and administer the FSL’s rules and regulations.5 Second, the
law tightens and streamlines national food safety standards, by placing the Ministry of Health
(“MOH”) in charge of developing and publicizing new national food safety standards that are
scientific, reasonable, safe and reliable.6 Finally, the FSL imposes more rigorous penalties on
food producers and traders who engage in illegal food safety practices and defines the illegal acts
of government officials that would trigger a punishment under the FSL.7
However, the FSL has seen only limited success. The food poisoning cases in China are
still quite common and public mistrust in China’s food industry is high. This article takes the
position that, even though the FSL is an important piece of legislation, the law, as it was drafted,
has several limitations. First, the national food safety standards are obsolete, lacking,

3

See Céline Gossner, Jørgen Schlundt, Peter Embarek, et al., The Melamine Incident: Implications for International
Food and Feed Safety, Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol. 117, No. 12, Dec., 2009, at 1803-1808, available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30249857.
4
See Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Gou Shipin Anquan Fa (Shi Xing), Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of
China, promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 28, 2009, effective June 1, 2009, (P.R.C)
[hereinafter Food Safety Law], available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200903/146327461.pdf.
5
Id. art. 11.
6
Id. art. 1, 7-10.
7
Id. art. 84, 91-93.
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inconsistent, overlap or are duplicates of already existing standards.8 Second, the FSL failed to
cut or consolidate the number of agencies, despite the FSL’s efforts to nationalize China’s
monitoring and enforcement system through the Food Safety Committee (“FSC”). Third, the law
is only partially successful at preventing future incidences of food safety violations. Even though
the FSL does a relatively good job in identifying punishable illegal activities, there are no
provisions referring to the issue of deterrence.
In addition to FSL’s limitations, the Chinese government faces several substantial
enforcement obstacles. This article argues that while the FSL proposes solutions to China’s food
safety problems, it will have to overcome serious implementation obstacles, such as: local
economic protectionism; corruption, unscrupulous practices and lack of integrity; and
environment influences on food safety.
Part I of this article examines the FSL’s vital provisions and recognizes the FSL’s partial
success. Part II addresses FSL’s limitations and offers suggestions for how the law can be
expanded to address the root causes of food safety problems. Part III exposes the obstacles the
Chinese government faces in enforcing the FSL. In Part IV, the article concludes, that before
China can regain the public trust in the safety of the Chinese foods, the government needs to step
up its efforts not only legislatively, but must also develop effective enforcement mechanisms.
I.

The Food Safety Law Of 2009

The public outcry over the death of six infants and the devastating long-term injuries of
as many as three hundred thousand others, who consumed the melamine tainted infant formula,
has prompted the passage of China’s Food Safety Law.9 On February 28, 2009, after a five year
drafting period, China’s NPC Standing Committee passed the first comprehensive Food Safety
8

Yang Lina, China punishes food safety criminals in 2011, XINHUA, Feb. 09, 2012,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-02/09/c_131401041.htm.
9
Gossner at al., supra note 3.
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Law (“FSL”), which entered into effect on June 1, 2009. 10 This section highlights significant
FSL provisions that have had the highest impact on the Chinese food industry since FSL’s
enactment.

A. Centralized Surveillance and Assessment of Food Safety Risks
Recognizing China’s inefficient food monitoring system as one of the main causes of
previous food safety violations, the NPC, as “the highest organ of state power,”11 decided to
create a new governmental department solely dedicated to food safety oversight and enforcement
of applicable standards and regulations.12 The new department, accordingly named the Food
Safety Committee, was an essential ingredient in trying to prevent and resolve future incidences
of food safety violations.13 To assure the creation of the FSC, the NPC included Article 4 in the
FSL, which requires the State Council14 to establish the FSC and put it in charge of supervising
and coordinating the work of five regulatory departments under the State Council, including

10

See Food Safety Law, supra note 4.
See Susan Lawrence, Michael Martin, Understanding China’s Political System, Congressional Research Service,
March 20, 2013, at 7, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41007.pdf. (The constitution also gives the NPC
numerous powers, such as the power to amend the constitution, supervise its enforcement, enact and amend laws,
ratify and abrogate treaties, approve state budget and plans for national economic and social development, elect and
impeach top officials of the state and judiciary and supervise the work of the State Central Military Commission,
the Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. In practice, however, the NPC has those
powers only on paper due to the dual identity of many of its deputies and the way they are elected.)
12
Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 4. See also Shan Juan, New department devoted to food safety,
CHINADAILY, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/food/2013-03/05/content_16278075.htm. (last updated March 05,
2013).
13
Id.
14
Id. See also Lawrence, supra note 11, at 31. (State Council is the highest administrative body in the state. It
includes State Council’s Legislative Affairs Office (“SCLAO”), which is regularly involved in the formulation of
national laws and regulations. SCLAO “drafts the government’s legislative agenda on a year-to-year basis and then
works with relevant government ministries and agencies to implement the agenda, including overseeing the drafting
of regulations and laws.”)
11
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departments of health, agriculture, quality supervision, industry and commerce administration,
and food and drug supervision.15
According to Liu Xirong, the vice chairman of the NPC Law Committee, the FSC’s
primary task was to function as a “high level coordinating organization” and to identify and
solve food safety problems within China’s food safety system before they lead to tragedies.16 In
2010, the State Council has formed the FSC, consisting of three vice premiers
Liangyu and

ang ishan

Li Keqiang, Hui

and a dozen minister-level officials.17 As mandated under the

FSL,18 the State Council exercised its authority directing FSC’s high-profile panel of government
officials to analyze China’s food safety situation, guide and coordinate food safety work, make
food safety policies, and urge the relevant departments to fulfill their responsibilities in food
supervision.”19
To improve the coordination among regulatory departments under the State Council, the
FSL has conferred the primary authority to formulate and enforce the national monitoring plan
on food safety risks to the MOH.20 In addition, the FSL directed the local government executive
departments of health to formulate and enforce those plans within their respective jurisdiction in
accordance with the national monitoring plans on food safety risks.21 Essentially, the MOH has

15

Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 4.
China to set up central food safety commission, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the U.S., Feb. 25,
2009, available at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t539233.htm.
17
China's determination to ensure food safety, China.org., Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.china.org.cn/china/201002/11/content_19411151.htm.
18
Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 4. (The FSL does not provide any guidance regarding the membership or the
duties of the FSC. It is up to the State Council to decide how the FSC should be staffed and what responsibilities and
duties it should have.)
19
Cai Hong, Food safety system needs more bite, CHINADAILY, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/201204/14/content_15046822.htm (last updated April 14, 2012).
20
Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 11. (Even though, MOH has the leading role in governing food safety, it must
work with the relevant State Council departments.)
21
Id. art. 5,11,70. (The FSL directs the local governments to define the regulatory responsibilities in accordance
with the national standards and the State Council regulations and to establish and enforce a food safety
accountability system, which must oversee the regulatory food safety agencies. To put it differently, the FSL places
the local governments on the forefront of food inspections requiring a system of food safety regulations at every step
16
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the primary responsibility for the overall food safety coordination; it must evaluate food safety
risks, formulate food safety standards, issue public notifications on food safety, develop
accreditation norms for food testing agencies and investigate major food safety incidents.22 If the
MOH discovers any problems relating to food safety, it is required under the FSL to organize
inspections and food safety risk assessments immediately.23 To offer technological and scientific
support for the regulators in evaluating, monitoring, and communicating food security risks and
food safety standards, as well as issuing early warnings, the MOH has launched the National
Center for Food Safety Risk Assessment (“Center”) in 2011.24 Since then, the Center has
established more than three hundred monitoring locations across the country, including sites in
supermarkets and farm produce markets.25
The national monitoring plan on food safety risks has shown some noteworthy success in
detecting food safety violations.26 In 2011, the FSC has reported that in response to concerns
about the use of harmful food additives, the official investigators have inspected close to six

in the food chain. If a food safety incident occurs, local governments have the obligation to formulate and submit
emergency plans within their jurisdictions to the higher level government based on relevant laws, regulations and
emergency plan of the higher level government.)
22
Id. art 4, 13-14. (In respect to other regulatory agencies, the FSL requires the General Administration of Quality
Supervision, Inspection and uarantine (“GA SI ”), the State Administration for Industry and Commerce
(“SAIC”) and the State Food and Drug Administration (“SFDA”) to regulate food manufacturing, food distribution
and catering service, respectively, in accordance with the set national standards. The FSL requires the MOH in
conjunction with GAQSIQ, SAIC and SFDA to formulate and enforce national assessment mechanisms for food
safety risks. The MOH is responsible for organizing scientifically conducted food safety risk assessments.)
23
Id. art. 14-16, 72. (GAQSIQ, SAIC and SFDA must make recommendations on food safety risk assessment and
offer relevant information and documents. If the inspections and assessments confirm that a food is dangerous, the
regulatory agencies (GAQSIQ, SAIC and SFDA) must take immediate actions to stop consumption of the unsafe
food. In extraordinary cases the executive department of health is authorized to immediately formulate or modify the
applicable food safety standards.)
24
China forms food safety risk assessment center, Chinese Government’s Official eb Portal, Oct. 14, 2011,
http://english.gov.cn/2011-10/14/content_1969694.htm.
25
Id. See also, Zhen Jinran, High hopes for new food safety monitoring, CHINADAILY, March 15, 2013,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-03/15/content_16310118.htm (A researcher at the China National
Center for Food Risk Assessment under the Ministry of Health has stated earlier this year that “[a]ll of China's
provinces and at least half of its cities and counties will have monitoring sites by 2013.”).
26
Austin Ramzy, China Food Safety: Big Crackdown, but Big Concerns Remain, TIME, Aug. 5, 2011,
http://world.time.com/2011/08/05/china-food-safety-big-crackdown-but-big-concerns-remain/.
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million food and additive producers.27 As a result of these investigations, Chinese authorities
have arrested 2,000 individuals and ordered closings of 4,900 businesses suspected to have been
involved in food safety violations.28 The successful enforcement was a product of an effective
collaboration of several regulatory executive departments under the State Council, including
agricultural, industrial, commercial, quality control and food authorities. 29 Nevertheless, as
noted by China’s Premier

en Jiabo, “China's food industry is still suffering from

unstandardized management and many hidden safety risks.”30
Accordingly, reflecting continuous efforts to improve food safety, the State Council has
laid out measures in June 2012, calling for strengthening regulatory oversight and imposing
harsher punishments on violators.31 In particular, the State Council has emphasized the need for
the government to enhance supervision by establishing “an efficient mechanism that [would]
cover all links in the food industry.”32 One such mechanism that closes the regulatory oversight
gap is the state licensing requirement for food producers and traders. 33 Under the FSL’
mandatory state licensing system, any organization or individual involved in the food business is
required to obtain a proper license.34 Reflecting the seriousness of combating oversight
loopholes, the Standing Committee of the 13th Beijing Municipal People's Congress passed a bill

27

Id.
Id.
29
Id.
30
Anne Tang, China introduces measures to enhance food safety, Chinese Government’s Official eb Portal, June
13, 2012, http://english.gov.cn/2012-06/13/content_2160318.htm.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 29.
34
Id. art 29, 31. 43-48. (The relevant executive regulatory departments at the county level and above have the
authority to grant or deny a licensing application upon reviewing the application and inspecting the applicant’s
production or trading facilities, if necessary. In addition, the FSL requires a state license for the production of novel
foods, new food additive varieties or new food related products. The safety of the new foods and food additives must
be reviewed by the MOH.)
28
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earlier this year that went into effect on April 1, 2013.35 The bill revokes state licenses issued to
food producers and vendors who produce or sell unsafe foods, and effectively bans these food
producers and vendors from the sector for life.36
In addition to defining responsibilities of central and local governments with respect to
food safety regulations, the FSL has also embraces the involvement of non-governmental third
parties.37 In particular, the FSL requires food producers and traders to strictly follow the
applicable laws and food safety standards and mandates food industry associations to tighten
their self-discipline. 38 In line with the FSL mandates, the State Council urged Chinese food
industries in 2012 to “accept primary responsibility in ensuring food quality and safety.”39 This
responsibility includes regular inspections to ensure that preventive measures are implemented
and to eliminate potential food safety risks as soon as possible.40 The FSL also encourages
media’s and consumers’ involvement in food safety enforcement.41 China’s latest efforts to
“encourage the public to report illegal activities [] to control and eliminate potential safety risks
concerning food and medicine” have been to provide citizens with monetary rewards for
legitimate reports on food safety violations.42
35

Beijing to roll out tough food safety law, Xinhua, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201212/27/c_132067702.htm (last updated Dec. 27, 2012) (Individuals, companies, or executives of companies
responsible for food safety problems will be banned from operating in the food industry for five years after their
firm’s license revocation.)
36
Id.
37
Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 1, 7-10.
38
Id
39
Tang, supra note 28.
40
Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 60, 70, 71. (The FSL eliminated the food safety inspection exemption,
subjecting food industries to the same national standards across the board.)
41
Id. art. 1, 7-10.
42
China to reward food and drug whistleblowers, CHINADAILY, Jan. 15, 2013,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-01/15/content_16122373.htm (According to SFDA circular, China will
give up to 300,000 yuan ($48,000) cash reward to individuals for their reports on food safety violations.) However,
it is questionable if people will in fact come forward, particularly because China is known for punishing activists for
disturbing “social harmony”. See also Andrew Jacobs, China Sentences Activist in Milk Scandal to Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/world/asia/11beijing.html?_r=0 (In 2010 China has
sentenced Zhao Lianhai, whose son was injured by the tainted formula in 2008, for speaking to foreign reporters,
organizing a website for aggrieved parents and inciting social disorder.)
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The struggle with achieving effective supervision over Chinese food industry has spurred
a wave of technological innovations. For example, electronic food-safety tracking system can be
used to check the manufacturer’s identity.43 According to Sun Pishu, the CEO of the Chinese
information-technology company Inspur Group Co Ltd, “control[ing] food quality without the
use of technology” and monitoring foods’ origins absent a food-tracking system is nearly
impossible or at best enormously challenging."44 Not surprisingly, the hope is that technological
advancements will aid Chinese regulators to better monitor the food industry and help consumers
to hold food manufacturers accountable for the quality of their products through increased
transparency.
B. Unified Food Safety Standards, Stricter Controls over Food Additives
Frequent media announcements about toxic Chinese food products highlight the need for
uniform national food safety standards in the Chinese food industry. Thus, to protect public
health, the NPC included important provisions in the FSL requiring the MOH to develop and
publicize mandatory national food safety standards.45 The standards are required to have a
scientific basis and be reasonable, safe and reliable.46 In addition, the standards must be subject
to review and approval by the Food Safety National Standards Evaluation Committee
(“Evaluation Committee”), consisting of an elaborate expert panel and the representatives from
relevant executive regulatory departments under the State Council.47 In December 2009, the

Pliny Han, Govt set to establish food safety program, Chinese Government’s Official eb Portal, March 15,
2012, http://english.gov.cn/2012-03/15/content_2092545.htm
44
Id.
45
Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 20, 21. 24,25 (The pesticide residue limits and their testing methods must be
developed by the MOH and the Ministry of Agriculture (“MOA”) under the State Council. The complete list of food
safety standards can be found under Article 20. In addition, the FSL requires the local executive departments and
food industries to develop and strengthen local and industry standards, respectively, to ensure food quality and
safety.)
46
Id. art. 18.
47
Id. art. 23. (The amount of discretion held by the MOH is unclear. The FSL states simply that the expert panel
must include experts in the field of medicine, agriculture, food, nutrition.)
43
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Chinese government has gathered a panel of forty two experts in the fields of hygiene,
agriculture, food and nutrition to conduct risk assessment on food safety.48
Last year, the MOH and seven other departments have jointly released the “12th FiveYear Plan for National Food Safety Standards” (“Plan”), which recognized the MOH’s
significant achievements on the subject of food safety and China’s overall efforts to upgrade
regulations and strengthen food safety standards.49 The deputy director of Health Supervision
Bureau of the MOH, Su Zhi, has stated that the administration is not only “making efforts to
expand the number of qualified personnel from 93,000 to more than 100,000 by the end of
2015,” but also “make[s] special efforts to set standards for testing various contaminants, food
additives and animal drug residue in food production by then."50 Additionally, the MOH has
made significant progress in streamlining and integrating existing food standards51 on foods like
vegetable oil, meat products, milk and dairy products, and promulgating 269 new national food
safety standards for milk, food additive use and pesticide residue limits among other items.52
Despite increased efforts to strengthen food safety standards, the MOH received plenty of
criticism especially in relation to the new standards for milk that became effective on June 1,
2010.53 Surprisingly, the new dairy standards were increased in the maximum limit for bacteria

48

China Sets Up Expert Panel to Assess Food Safety, CHINADAILY, Dec. 9, 2009,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-12/09/content_9147922.htm.
49
12th Five Year Plan for National Food Safety Standard (herein “12th Five-Year Plan”), GAIN Report, June 28,
2012, available at http://gain.fas.usda.gov. (The 12th Five-Year Plan is a document that sets economic and social
policy objectives and incorporates international standards and experiences in administering the standards. The Plan
is “formulated in accordance with the Food Safety Law, its implementing regulations and plans related to national
food safety supervision for the purposes of carrying out national food safety standard work and improving the
standard system.” The Plan is divided into several sections, which focus on China’s achievements and weaknesses,
as well as on the guiding ideology, basic principles, objectives and tasks, as they relate to food safety. The Plan is
mostly aspirational in character, but provides several practical considerations for how to achieve food safety.)
50
China forms food safety risk assessment center, supra note 24.
51
12th Five Year Plan, supra note 51. (Prior to the FSL, China had over 2,000 national standards, over 2,900
industrial standards and over 1,200 local standards on food, food additive and food-related products.)
52
Id.
53
Ministry defends controversial milk standard, China.org., Dec. 1, 2011, http://www.china.org.cn/china/201112/01/content_24050529.htm.
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in raw milk, or the aerobic plate count, and lowered in the protein content requirement, reflecting
one of the weakest standards for milk in the world.54 This decision seems somewhat
counterintuitive. Instead of encouraging dairy producers to improve their milk production
practices, the MOH decided to reduce milk quality requirements in order to accommodate dairy
farmers’ lower benchmarks. However, responding to the criticisms, the MOH official, Zhang
Xudong, defended the standards stating that the presence of dairy producers in the drafting
committee was important because their livelihood potentially depended on it.55 In addition,
advocates of the new standard and the dairy farmers believe that the reduced standard is a
practical compromise in light of China’s small scale milk production and different feeding
environments, which reflect large disparities in the types and quality of dairy cows within the
dairy industry.56 Nevertheless, this compromise does not affect the increased controls for
melamine contamination, which requires manufacturers to keep complete records of inputs and
to test all dairy products for melamine prior to distribution.57
C. Increased Penalties For Non-Compliance
China’s reaction to frequent food safety violations has been increasingly resolute and the
administration continuously imposes harsher punishments against food safety violators and
corrupt or underperforming food inspection agencies and government officials.58

54

Id.
Id.
56
Dairy and Products Annual, GAIN Report (Oct. 22, 2010), available at http://gain.fas.usda.gov. See also Dexter
Roberts, China Sets Up a Food Safety Super-Regulator, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, March 14, 2014,
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-14/china-sets-up-a-food-safety-super-regulator
(“China is home to an estimated 200 million families that farm, each cultivating an average plot of 1.5 acres, as well
as a half-million food processing companies, most with fewer than 10 employees. The small scale of most
agriculture and food processing means the owners have limited resources to invest in the advanced techniques that
could ensure better quality.”)
57
Id.
58
Fang, China court upholds death sentences in milk scandal, XINHUA, March 26, 2009,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/26/content_11078553.htm.
55
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In line with the central government’s severe punishment agenda, the FSL subjects food
manufacturers and distributors, who engage in illegal food production or trading, to confiscation
of illegal gains and benefits, including food and food additives illegally produced or traded, as
well as tools and equipment used during the illegal food production or trading.59 In addition, the
law imposes penalties and fines on the violators and authorizes revocation of business licenses,
either temporarily or permanently.60 In the same year the FSL was passed, China has revoked
6,045 food production licenses from 5,654 producers, reflecting major governmental efforts to
improve food safety in the country.61
Acknowledging that corruption and bribery have plagued China’s food industry for the
past several years,62 the NPC included provisions in the FSL addressing these issues.63
Specifically, the provisions direct higher authorities to revoke the certificates of qualification
from food inspection agencies or personnel issuing fraudulent inspection reports or publishing
false advertising.64 The provisions also authorize the removal or dismissal of the managers or the
personnel directly involved in the fraud or false advertising.65 To further insure that the food
inspection agencies comply with the set standards, the FSL prohibits managers or personnel
directly involved in fraudulent inspection reports to work as food inspectors for ten years after
the incident.66 Similarly, if local government officials or regulatory executive departments fail to
perform their duties in accordance with the law, abuse their authority or engage in corruption,
59

Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 84.
Id. art. 84-97.
61
Zhu Zhe, 6,045 food licenses revoked for quality problems, CHINADAILY, Jan. 7, 2010,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-01/07/content_9281069.htm.
62
See, Bin Dong and Benno Torgler, The Causes of Corruption: Evidence from China (June 21, 2010), FEEM
Working Paper No. 72.2010, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1628107 (“The Chinese Government has
admitted that corruption “is now worse than during any other period since New China was founded in 1949. It has
spread into the Party, into Government administration and into every part of society, including politics, economy,
ideology and culture.”)
63
Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 91-93.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
60
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and a serious food safety incident occurs, the FSL demands removal, demotion or dismissal of
those directly responsible.67
In addition to fines and removal of responsible parties, the FSL subjects any violator,
who commits a serious food safety violation to criminal prosecution.68 Although, the FSL does
not directly discuss criminal penalties, it does refer to the application of the Criminal Law of
China.69 On February 25, 2011, Hu Jintao, China’s former top official, announced the 8th
Amendment to the Criminal Law of China.70 The amendments came into force on May 1, 201171
and included several significant food safety revisions, such as Article 143,72 14473 and 408A74.
Under the revised Law, food producers and distributors, who produce or sell unsafe
foods, which might cause any serious food poisoning or a serious food borne disease will face up

67

Id. art. 95. (The relevant authorities include authority for supervision and authority for appointment and
dismissal.)
68
Id. art. 98.
69
Id.
70
Amendment (VIII) to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (herein “Criminal Law Amendment
III”), Adopted at the 19th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National People’s Congress of the
People’s Republic of China (Feb. 25, 2011), available at http://27.151.119.113/cms/html/english/2011-1212/258191.html.
71
Id.
72
Id. (Article 143 states: “ hoever produces or sells food not up to the food safety standards which may cause any
serious food poisoning accident or any other serious food-borne disease shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not
more than 3 years or criminal detention and a fine; if any serious damage is caused to the people’s health or there is
any other serious circumstance, shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 3 years but not more than 7
years and a fine; or if there are especially serious consequences, shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than
7 years or life imprisonment and a fine or forfeiture of property.”)
73
Id. (Article 144 is amended as: “ hoever mixes poisonous or harmful non-food raw materials into food produced
or sold or knowingly sells food mixed with poisonous or harmful non-food raw materials shall be sentenced to
imprisonment of not more than 5 years and a fine; if any serious damage is caused to the people’s health or there is
any other serious circumstance, shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 5 years but not more than 10
years and a fine; or if any human death is caused or there is any other especially serious circumstance, shall be
punished according to the provisions of Article 141 of this Law.” Paragraph 1 of Article 141 is amended as:
“ hoever produces or sells bogus drugs shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not more than 3 years or criminal
detention and a fine; if any serious damage is caused to the people’s health or there is any other serious
circumstance, shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 3 years but not more than 10 years and a fine; or if
any human death is caused or there is any other especially serious circumstance, shall be sentenced to imprisonment
of not less than 10 years, life imprisonment or death penalty and a fine or forfeiture of property.”)
74
Id. (Article 408A: “ here a state functionary with food safety supervision and management functions abuses his
powers or neglects his duties, if any serious food safety accident or other serious consequence is caused, he shall be
sentenced to imprisonment of not more than 5 years or criminal detention; or if any especially serious consequence
is caused, be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 5 years but not more than 10 years.”)
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to three years in prison. 75 If the unsafe food causes a serious damage to the people’s health, the
sentence will be increased to up to seven years, and in extraordinarily serious cases even beyond
seven years.76 The punishment is more severe for those who “mix poisonous or harmful nonfood raw materials into food produced or sold or knowingly sell food mixed with poisonous or
harmful non-food raw materials.” 77 Those individuals can face life imprisonment and even death
penalty in the most severe situations.78 Recognizing a growing prevalence of corruption in
China’s food industry,79 the amendments impose criminal penalties of up to ten years on state
regulators with food safety supervision and management authority, who knowingly abuse their
power or negligently abandon their duties as regulators.80
These amendments were implemented to protect “people’s livelihood” according to the
statements by the NPC’s Commission for Legislative Affairs, and ensure that the violators are
held accountable for their criminal acts. 81 Nevertheless, the initial reports indicate that despite
the harsh punishments under China’s Criminal Law, the country is still struggling to solve its
food safety crisis, as evidenced by countless reports of food safety violations since the passage of
the FSL. 82
II.

Limits of the 2009 Food Safety Law

The previous section explored several key provisions in the FSL that have had the highest
impact on the Chinese food industry. However, the FSL has several weaknesses that limit its
75
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success in ensuring national food safety. This section fosters a detailed discussion of some of the
major limitations of the FSL, which include problems with the uniformity of food safety
standards, the challenges associated with having a high number of regulatory agencies, and the
FSL’s difficulties in providing sufficient and effective incentives to discourage food safety
violations.

A. Problems With the Uniformity of Food Safety Standards
The FLS’s mandatory national food safety standard system signifies a substantial
progress toward ensuring China’s food safety. However, there is more work to be done. China’s
12th Five-Year Plan, even though aspirational, provides a framework for areas in the FSL that
require improvement.83
China’s central regulatory departments acknowledged in the 12th Five-Year Plan for
National Food Safety Standards that China’s current standards for food safety are restrained by
the fast-paced development and risk assessment of the food industry.84 To put it differently,
safety standards that are presently in place do not match food industry’s developments. This can
create substantial challenges for the regulators in trying to identify whether a food company
produces food that is, in fact, safe. The FSL offers only a limited guidance in this regard.
Specifically, the FSL emphasizes the need for “scientific, reasonable, safe and reliable” national
standards.85 However, there is no mandate as to how recent the scientific basis for the standards
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should be. This leaves regulators enforcing standards that are outdated and lack generality and
risk assessment.86
Another difficulty facing the regulators and inspection agencies is the patchwork of
duplicative, overlapping and inconsistent standards.87 This problem traces back to the period
before the FSL’s promulgation, when different ministries separately developed food safety
standards pursuant to their portfolios, without ever cross referencing them with other
ministries.88 Even though there is some effort in the FSL to require consolidation of national
food safety standards by the MOH among existing quality and safety standards in Articles 22 and
23, there are still many national standards that are either lacking, inconsistent, overlap or are
duplicates of already existing standards.89
To complicate the matters, the FSL explicitly allowed local governments in autonomous
regions and at the provincial and municipal levels,90 as well as food enterprises, to develop local
and industry food safety standards, in areas where the MOH failed to develop national
standards.91 Such an explicit authorization creates a risk that local and industry standards will be
used to protect local industries.92 Local officials may have the incentive to either keep local food
safety standards low, or rely on the lack of national standards and not see the necessity to
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implement standards in the first place, creating an uncertain environment for food safety.93
Accordingly, a national food safety system that is inaccurate, incomplete and not-uniform is
likely to cause oversight failures, with potentially tragic outcomes.94
Quite often, in developing countries, like China, food safety standards are less effective
because they often lack technical and institutional capacity for effective enforcement.95
However, China’s situation can be improved. The 12th Year-Plan recommends developing
national uniform standards for detection methods and food packaging materials, as well as
improving basic research and risk assessments.96 China also needs to develop a “safeguarding
mechanism” by establishing a full time technical organization for national food safety standards
that is adequately funded and employs a competent panel of skilled researchers and
professionals.97 Even though this may create an additional layer of bureaucracy, China needs to
cultivate a competent standard team of professionals and a standard research capacity to ensure
effective and uniform food safety standards that are in line with industry developments and risk
assessments.
Despite the problems with the national food standards in the FSL, China does not blindly
ignore its weaknesses, but in fact recognizes the importance of high food standards as the means
to regain the trust within China as well as in the international community. Thus, it is particularly
promising that China now actively participates in formulation of the international food codex,
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where it develops a plan with other countries for how to improve food safety and the quality of
pesticide products.98
B. Too Many Agencies in Charge of Enforcing China’s Food Safety Standards
In the wake of the melamine crisis, health experts have put the blame for the failure to
detect food safety problems, on China’s “disjointed” government structure.99 The World Health
Organization's former top food-safety official, Jorgen Schlundt, emphasized in 2008 before the
passage of the FSL that China’s authority for food-safety enforcement is "dispersed" among too
many agencies and different levels of government.100 Essentially, China’s regulatory agencies
operated vertically and failed to communicate or exchange crucial information, which lead to
substantial loopholes in China’s regulatory system.
To solve this problem, the FSL directed the State Council to establish the FSC to
supervise and coordinate the work of regulatory departments under the State Council.101 The
creation of the FSC represented a significant milestone for China, in trying to improve its food
safety monitoring system. However, the FSL stopped short of reducing or consolidating the
number of regulatory agencies. It merely defined their duties with more specificity.102 According
to China’s Health Minister, Chen Zhu, there are currently too many regulatory agencies that are
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in charge of implementing approximately 5,000 overlapping and contradictory food safety
standards, which include national, local and industry standards.103
Institutional overabundance is often plagued by regulatory overlap, and increased
potential for oversight loopholes.104 In addition, having many regulators with overlapping
authorities unnecessarily raises the cost of regulation.105 Thus, under the current FSL, an
enterprise that not only produces food, but also distributes and offers catering services is subject
to the regulatory oversight by three different agencies. To remove duplicative jurisdiction and
economize government funds while continuing to protect people’s health, a new rule needs to be
developed that would effectively streamline China’s food safety efforts.
In mid-March of this year, Mr. Ma Kai, China's State Council secretary-general, told the
NPC that the State Council will reduce the number of ministries and commissions from 27 to 25
and reorganize several administrative agencies because even though "the State Council has
established a framework that meets the needs of the socialist market economy, [it] still has
notable shortcomings".106 One of the changes is the incorporation of the SFDA and the State
Food Safety Office into a food and drug administration that will address increasing public
concerns about food safety.107 The reason for the seventh restructuring attempt in the past thirty
years is central government’s concern about “duplications of functions, overlapping
management, low efficiency and bureaucracy”, which to some degree have facilitated instances
of corruption and dereliction of duty.108
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At the local level, the regulatory problems caused by the myriad of executive regulatory
departments are even more pronounced and the FSL does a relatively poor job of addressing
those problems. Essentially, the FSL places the authority with the local people’s governments at
and above county level to establish and enforce a food safety accountability system, and oversee
and coordinate the regulatory food safety agencies within their respective jurisdictions.109 The
agencies must in turn coordinate with each other and implement and enforce the law.110
Promising on the paper, but challenging in reality, local governments often lack the capacity111
and/or the incentive112 to establish effective oversight. Yet, despite the FSL’s well-intended
mandates directing local governments to formulate and submit emergency plans within their
jurisdictions to the higher level government in case of serious food safety violations, the FSL has
not been every effective in addressing the issue of resources and incentives.113
Thus, even though the creation of the FSC and the recent attempts by the State Council to
restructure current administrative institutions, are "good example[s] of China's institutional
reform and would facilitate the enforcement of laws and regulations to ensure food safety,"114 a
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more streamed line approach of consolidating or eliminating agencies is needed to reduce
oversight loopholes, eliminate overlap between agencies and decrease the cost of regulations.
C. The FSL Fails to Provide Incentives for Compliance
Overall, the FSL does a relatively good job in establishing what activities are illegal and
when individuals, who engage in illegal activities, are subject to civil sanctions or criminal
penalties. Similarly, the FSL correctly recognizes the weakness in the Chinese food industry and
addresses violations at the food production and distribution levels, as well as corruption
problems at the administrative level. However, the law has several noteworthy shortcomings.
One limitation is China’s inconsistent enforcement of the FSL. Under Article 95 of the
FSL, if local government officials at the county level or above neglect their duties under the law,
engage in fraud or corruption and directly cause a food safety incident that has a “serious impact
on society,” they must be removed from office.115 The language used in this Article implies that
if the safety incident is not serious, yet a government official has neglected his or her duties
under the FSL, committed fraud or has been involved in corruption, the official will nonetheless
be able to retain the current position. In light of the high prevalence of corruption and fraud,116 it
is rather disappointing that the FSL seemingly qualifies the severity of the health hazard. In other
words, a corrupt official will remain in office provided that the food safety incident does not
result in casualties. In practice, there is a lack of uniformity in the enforcement of the law.
Whereas some government officials, involved in food safety incidents, escape criminal
prosecution,117 others receive harsh punishments.118
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Another limitation is evident from the FSL’s inability to effectively deter food safety
violations. At the time the FSL was promulgated, the goal was to insure that cases like melamine
in the infant formula and clenbuterol contaminated meat will never be repeated. Accordingly, to
prevent frequent episodes of food safety violations, the FSL focused its attention on harsh
punishments of individuals, who violate the law.119 Even though severe penalties are crucial to
achieve justice for the victims and are helpful in deterring violations, it is equally important to
provide positive incentives to individuals, organizations, regulatory agencies and local
government officials to comply with the law and ensure a safe and healthy food industry.
Nevertheless, the FSL has not devoted sufficient attention to actual incentives for
individuals to refrain from committing food safety violations.120 This is not to say that the law is
completely ignorant to the importance of educating individuals involved in food production
about food safety.121 However, the FSL lacks provisions urging individuals involved in the food
business that compliance with the law will not only benefit consumers, but will offset the cost of
compliance and ensure higher returns for the food manufacturers and traders in the long run.
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The main problem the Chinese food industry faces is the lack of trust in the safety of the
Chinese products.122 In addition to poisoned food products, China has also seen an alarming
growth of counterfeit products in the recent years, such as counterfeit medicine,123 eggs124 and
infant formula.125 As a result, a growing number of foreign food and dairy companies either
already entered or are in the process of entering and establishing their presence in China126 in
order to exploit customers’ fear of locally produced products.127 Food safety is no longer a
burden, but rather a marketing strategy for forward looking companies seeking long-term
profits.128
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To prevent losses to China’s food industry due to the tarnished reputation of its domestic
products,129 the FSL must increase its efforts to persuade food manufacturers, and traders that
food safety is in everyone’s interest in the long run and develop a system for discouraging
government officials and regulators from taking bribes.130
III.

China’s Obstacles In Enforcing The Food Safety Law

The first two sections of this article have analyzed the FSL, identified its weaknesses and
made several proposals for how the new law can be improved. The rest of the paper will focus on
the enforcement obstacles the Chinese government faces in implementing and enforcing the FSL.
Essentially, the paper argues that even if the FSL’s shortfalls are cured, the Chinese government
will remain unable to enforce the law due to the following three impediments: China’s local
economic protectionism; Corruption, unscrupulous practices and deteriorating moral integrity;
and Environmental influences on food safety.
A. China’s Local Economic Protectionism
In order to fully understand how local protectionism undermines successful
implementation of the FSL, it is critical to appreciate China’s centralized government structure.
Chinese government is comprised of a central government located in Beijing and a four-level
hierarchical organizational system of local governments, consisting of provinces, counties, cities
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and townships.131 As noted in the Section I of this article, the NPC is the “highest organ of state
power.”132 It has the authority to supervise the work of the State Council, which promulgates
regulations and submits them to the NPC for the final approval.133
At the local level, government officials are allowed to pass local laws and regulations,
provided that those are approved by the central government.134 The right to pass local laws and
regulations can be traced back to China’s 1980s agricultural reforms, when China attempted to
syndicate central planning and market-oriented reforms with the goal to increase production,
achieve technological advancements and raise the standard of living.135 To achieve the desired
economic and social progress, China introduced the “household responsibility system.”136
Through this system, land was distributed to the farmers, who were for the first time allowed to
keep their harvest and submit land rent at a later time.137 This development led to dramatic
increases in China’s productivity.138 At the same time, it led to profound changes in farmers/state
relations, where the state lost its “direct control” over the farmers.139 To retain some level of
control, the state began to expand its state administrations at the local level and allowed the local
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governments to develop its regional economies and experiment with approved policy methods.140
The reason behind this approval lies in the central government’s overarching objective to
increase China’s economic growth. 141 In other words, if local governments develop policies that
help increase China’s GDP, provided, of course, that they conform to Beijing’s rules and
regulations, China’s central government will not stand in the way of local innovation.
Accordingly, both central and local governments play an important role in the
formulation and implementation of food safety regulations. At the central level, the executive
departments under the State Council must coordinate, evaluate food safety risks, formulate food
safety standards, investigate major food safety incidents,142 and regulate food manufacturing,
food distribution and catering services in accordance with the set national standards.143 At the
local level, though, the regional governments develop local standards and conduct food
inspections. Regional governments stand on the forefront of food inspections and are utilized as
enforcement vehicles for the national and local food safety standards. Accordingly, to ensure a
successful and efficient implementation of the food safety standards, local governments’
cooperation, accountability and integrity are fundamentally important.
However, there is a lot of skepticism about local official’s integrity and accountability,
mainly because local officials are appointed by the party members at the next higher level of
government rather than elected by the people in their communities.144 At the sub-national level
of government, Chinese officials are promoted “almost entirely on the basis of their locality’s
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growth rates.”145 Accordingly, local officials are expected to produce high GDP rates as a
reflection of their regional economic success.146 The pressure to maintain high economic growth
and the lack of accountability to the local populace creates incentives for local officials to
exaggerate their economic success,147 and to exploit their communities at any cost.148
The fiscal reality of the local governments creates an additional layer of confusion in the
already muddled Chinese government system. When the central government began expanding its
institutions after China’s agricultural reforms in the 1980s, it failed to provide sufficient financial
resources to those institutions, forcing the local governments to look at alternative venues to get
their revenues.149 In today’s China, the local governments’ revenue greatly depends on the
success of the local enterprises. 150 To put it differently, local officials have built symbiotic
relationships with large local enterprises where both can reap the benefits from a mutual
cooperation. Thus, local governments benefit from the economic developments that local
businesses provide, whereas local businesses benefit because local officials are willing to close
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their eyes on food inspections and food safety regulations.151 In addition, even if the central
government passes new laws and regulations, local officials often complain that they do not have
the needed financial resources to implement the new rules.152 Consequently, because local
governments are allowed to develop their own economies and lack central government resources
due to fiscal decentralization,153 they have incentives to become overly protective of local
businesses, which in large parts finance the local regions through high tax revenues.154
One of the most prominent examples of local economic protectionism is the melamine
tainted formula incident that killed six infants and injured close to three hundred thousand
others.155 At the center of the 2008 scandal was the Sanlu Group (“Sanlu”), a state owned
Chinese dairy company based in Shijiazhuang, the capital of northern Hebei Province.156 Prior to
the melamine scandal, Sanlu was China's top seller of milk powder for 15 years.157 The 2008
melamine controversy revolved around the industrial chemical melamine, an illegal food additive
that is used to make fertilizer and industrial piping.158 If consumed, melamine can cause kidney
stones and kidney failure.159 Despite its well-known effects,160 the chemical has been added to
watered-down milk to make it appear higher in protein content and sold to dairy companies.161
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According to several published reports, Sanlu Group started receiving complaints about
the adulteration of its milk with the illegal chemical as early as 2007, but failed to take any
necessary steps.162 Instead, it approved the sale of 813 tons of melamine-tainted milk powder
between August 2nd and September 12th of 2008, making a profit close to 47.5 million yuan (6.9
million U.S. dollars).163 The officials in Shijiazhuang learned about the contaminated milk in
August of 2008.164 Shockingly, however, they withheld the information from the provincial
government until September, so as not to interrupt the Beijing Olympics.165 Unfortunately, by the
time the officials initiated nationwide recalls of the tainted milk powder, the damage had already
been done.166
Investigations into the melamine scandal revealed that at least twenty two dairy
companies had sold the melamine tainted formula in 2008 and possibly in 2007.167 Dozens of
people, implicated in the intentional adulteration of the milk formula were arrested, including
milk dealers who sold the tainted milk and middlemen who actually added melamine to the
watered down milk.168 However, only twenty one individuals were held responsible for the
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incident, with nineteen individuals sentenced to prison terms, including two suspended death
sentences and two individuals receiving the immediate death penalties.169 In addition, more than
thirty government officials were fired, forced to resign or disciplined.170 However, not a single
government official was arrested or prosecuted.171
Many have blamed Beijing’s lax policies on food safety for the melamine contaminated
milk incident.172 Instead of accepting some responsibility, the central government initially placed
the blame entirely on unscrupulous dairy company executives, farmers and middlemen.173
However, on August 20, 2008, Hu Jintao, China’s former top official, finally acknowledged that
“[t]here are ‘painful lessons’ to be drawn from a series of health scares in China” and that
“[t]hese incidents show that some officials have lost their sense of principals.”174 Not
surprisingly, two days later, the State Council decided that the General Administration of Quality
Supervision, Inspection and uarantine (“GAQSIQ”) had to take the “supervision responsibility
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for the milk food contamination” and accepted the Li Changjiang’s resignation from the post of
the GAQSIQ minister.175 At his resignation Li Changjiang publicly apologized for the melamine
tragedy.176
The melamine scandal revealed the extent to which local officials are willing to go in
order to protect large local employers, like Sanlu.177 Local businesses help the local governments
not only to develop the local economies through job creation and high tax revenues, but also to
advance local official’s political careers.178 According to a patent infringement investigator in
China, “local governments are always watching out for their local companies and the bigger the
company, the bigger the sway they’ll have.”179 Despite the FSL’s effort to strengthen oversight
and impose stricter food safety laws and regulations, there is no solution in the FSL for how to
address the problem of local protectionism and officials’ self-serving incentives. Likewise, the
FSL does not offer any fiscal solutions for how local governments can implement the new
rules.180 Consequently, as long as these problems remain unresolved, local protectionism will
likely continue to be a serious obstacle to the FSL enforcement.
B. Corruption, Unscrupulous Practices And Deteriorating Moral Integrity
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Corruption has permeated every sector of the Chinese society, including “politics,
economy, ideology and culture.”181 It presents one of the greatest obstacles to China’s
development in terms of food quality and safety.182 The main problem is that corruption
undermines government’s policies by encouraging opportunistic conduct of officials and private
actors that result in the violation of the food safety regulatory laws.183 Therefore, understanding
the causes of corruption and establishing anticorruption policies is essential in ensuring an
effective compliance with food safety laws and regulations.
On November 8, 2012, Hu Jintao, the former Chinese leader, cautioned in his speech at
the 18th Party Congress that if China does not effectively deal with corruption, it could
undermine and destroy China’s ruling Communist Party and the state.184 Thus, “combating
corruption and promoting political integrity, which is a major political issue of great concern to
the people is a clear cut and long term political commitment of the Party.”185
In cautioning about the destructive consequences of corruption, Hu Jintao called for a
“system of combating corruption through both punishment and prevention” and stressed that the
government should strengthen education about tackling corruption.186 He also emphasized the
necessity for a “system of accountability for improving Party conduct and upholding integrity”
and warned that “all those who violate Party discipline and state laws, whoever they are and
whatever power or official position they have, [] be brought to justice without mercy.”187
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Despite the encouraging rhetoric, China’s success at preventing corruption remains
relatively low. The FSL’s efforts to curtail the prevalence of corruption in the food industry are
still rather limited.188 There are several explanations for the relatively high prevalence of
corruption in China.
Research suggests that corruption is high whenever bureaucrats have discretionary power
associated with the “economic rents”189 and the deterrence to such corruption, is lacking or
“worth the risk”.190 Discretionary power increases with government size and the amount of
regulations.191 However, on its own, it does not pose a significant threat. In order for
discretionary power to lead to corruption, it must relate to economic rents.192 An important
source of economic rent is the absence of competition in economic activities.193 Thus, if
competition increases, economic rents decline, eliminating the marginal benefit individuals gain
from paying bribes.194 In regards to deterrence of corruption, research shows that higher
education and income, as well as the effectiveness of the country’s legal system and press
freedom affect the probability of detection of corruption.195
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In applying these research findings to China, local protectionism,196 has provided
significant insights into discretionary powers of local officials in developing local economies,
and deciding what policies will benefit their local communities.197 In addition, it shed light on
how the symbiotic relationship between local officials and regional business enterprises
promotes rent-seeking behavior, where corrupt officials often use their authority for personal
gain.198 Accordingly, discretionary power coupled with economic rents directly contributes to the
pervasiveness of corruption. However, unless there is a serious food safety incident, official
corruption often remains undetected.199
One of the reasons for the high prevalence of corruption is the inconsistent application
and enforcement of the laws. Whereas some officials receive harsh punishments, others escape
prosecution altogether. For example, while Mr. Zheng Xiaoyu, a former SFDA chief, was
executed for taking bribes in 2007, local officials involved in the 2008 melamine contaminated
milk incident, have completely escaped criminal prosecutions.200 Even though the local officials
chose to engage in a cover-up weeks before the story went to print and admitted the oversight
failures, including the obligation to report the incident to the higher authorities, not a single one
of them was criminally charged.201 As such, the inconsistent application of the laws creates a
perception that the probability of being caught for corrupt acts is relatively low.
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However, in regards to the penalties for corrupt acts, China has shown greater
consistency. China has one of the most rigorous punishment systems in the world, executing
thousands of prisoners each year.202 One of the well-publicized executions of a central
government official was the case of Zheng Xiaoyu, a former SFDA chief, who was executed in
2007 after being found guilty of corruption.203 Zheng Xiaoyu worked as a head of the SFDA
from 1998 until 2005, when he was charged and found guilty for taking bribes to approve
inferior medications, such as an antibiotic that was found to have caused the death of at least ten
individuals.204 The court sentenced him to death with a two-year reprieve.205 However, after the
two-year suspension, in an unusual turn of events, the Supreme Court ordered his immediate
execution.206 Such an extraordinarily harsh punishment of a central government official was
unusual, even for China. Yet, it reflected on Beijing’s determination to maintain a perception of
integrity and a commitment to its own people that no official, no matter how high the rank, can
escape from justice.207
Showing their efforts to crackdown on corruption, four Chinese government agencies
have jointly released a circular in 2010, endorsing harsher punishment for food safety crimes.208
The circular promised more severe punishments for corrupt government officials who accept
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bribes and protect or ignore food safety.209 In addition the document declared that “[g]enerally,
officials who are involved in food safety crimes should not be given a reprieve or be exempt
from criminal punishment.”210
A similar language was used earlier this year by, Mr. Xi Jinping, general secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (“CPC”), who swore to fight against
corruption.211 He declared before the CPC that the “power should be restricted by the cage of
regulations.”212 That is, the government should develop a “disciplinary, prevention and guarantee
mechanism” to discourage individuals from committing corruption.213 Especially encouraging, is
Xi Jinping’s determination to "fight every corrupt phenomenon [and] punish every corrupt
official, [] so as to earn people's trust with actual results."214 In addition, the CPC general
secretary demanded "no exception [] when it comes to Party disciplines and law” and promised
to investigate cases completely and without leniency for anyone involved.215
The aspirational words of Hu Jintao and the commitment of Xi Jinping to the fight
against corruption, strongly resonate with the Chinese people.216 According to the 2012 Pew
Global Attitudes China Project polls, fifty percent of Chinese blame corrupt officials and thirty
percent blame corrupt businesses for China’s problems.217 These public concerns are merited in
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light of the 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index that places China in 80th place out of 176
countries for being one of the most corrupt nations to do business.218
In an attempt to regain the public trust, China’s Premier

en Jiabao, publicly announced

that there is a need for “moral training” in the food industry to eliminate corruption and ensure
food safety.219 Moral training was included in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan and directed the FSC
to require training for all incoming workers in the food production industry.220 The training is
one of the authorities' efforts to restore the country's food industry.221 However, unless China
eliminates opportunities for rent-seeking behavior among officials and ensures consistent
application and enforcement of its laws, the prevalence of corruption will remain high. China
needs to firmly establish that the probability of being caught and the consequences, in terms of
punishment and financial losses for those who commit illegal acts, are high.
C. Environmental Influences on Food Safety
With yearly GDP rates of at least 7.5 percent,222 China’s rapid and persistent economic
growth has catapulted it in to the second place on the list of the world’s largest economies,
behind the US.223 However, China’s economic success has led to profound domestic
environmental consequences.224 For example, China’s pollution affects millions of people
directly, who suffer from various diseases due to immediate exposure to the toxins in the air and
218
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the drinking water.225 China’s pollution also affects millions of people indirectly through the
consumption of ecologically contaminated foods.226 Accordingly, environmental degradation
poses a sizeable obstacle to the ability of the Chinese government to enforce its food safety laws.
There is a growing concern among environmentalists about food safety in China, due to
the use and overuse of pesticides and fertilizers on China’s farm lands.227 The main reason for
the high use of pesticides and fertilizers among the Chinese farmers is the year-round planting of
crops, which leaves China’s soil without any natural nutrients.228 According to the Chinese
Academy of Agricultural Sciences (“CAAS”), fifty percent of China’s agricultural land currently
exceeds the internationally accepted limits of nitrogen fertilizer.229 The benefit of using
fertilizers is that it helps China to achieve high yields of grain harvests to insure food security for
a country of billion people.230 However, the overuse of fertilizers and pesticides causes severe
land degradation and decreases crop diversity.231 To make matters worse, the unabsorbed
fertilizers penetrate the soil and cause widespread groundwater nitrate pollution, making the
water unsafe to drink.232 Thus, “aquaculture production” is of particular concern to the people in
China, the Chinese government, and the scientists.233
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In addition to nitrate pollution, improper industrial disposal of electronic and plastic
waste chemicals as well as heavy metals such as cadmium, arsenic, mercury and petroleum
organic compounds, adulterate both: farm land and the nation’s rivers.234 According to the
research findings conducted by the CAAS, “about 16 percent of China's 120 million hectares of
farm land had suffered from pollution at different levels and 10 million hectares were polluted by
industrial pollutants.235 Likewise, a large percentage of China’s rivers is “so contaminated that it
should not even be touched, yet tremendous amounts of grains, vegetables, and fruits that are
served in homes and restaurants, as well as textiles that are sold in markets, are irrigated with
untreated industrial wastewater.”236 As one farmer from the Shandong Province has explained,
“there is no water source except for this dirty water.

e have to use it.”237 He admitted of using

water contaminated with chemicals to the extent that it appeared black during irrigation.238 And
even though most of the crop perished after being irrigated with contaminated water he and other
farmers sold whatever crop has survived.239
In recent years most of the attention undeniably went to the news reports on adulterated
rice - the staple of the Chinese diet - by heavy metals in the polluted soil.240 One of the heavy
metals found in rice was cadmium, which has been associated with bone and joint pains and in
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some cases kidney failures.241 In response to the public outrage, the Chinese government
promised to take necessary steps, such as setting “nationally significant standards for water, soil,
and food” to tackle the problem of toxic rice.242 However, according to a professor in agriculture
from the university in Nanjing, the severity and the pervasiveness of soil and groundwater
contamination is so substantial that “the pollutants will stay in the soil for hundreds of years
without a proper treatment.”243 In some instances the damage may even be “irreversible.”244 Not
surprisingly, some experts, like Fan Mingyuan, of the Water Resources Research Institute of
Shandong Province, conclude that the “crop security is the number one problem in the nation.”245
Similar to adulterated rice, the Chinese fishery business is greatly affected by industrial
waste, sewage and agricultural runoffs.246 One of Fuqing eel and shrimp farmers in the Fujian
Province described the local rivers as “filthy”.247 Faced with the toxic waters, fish farmers have
taken drastic measures in 2007 and began adding veterinary drugs and pesticides into the fish
feed to safe their stocks and secure their revenue.248 Yet, drugs and pesticides leave “poisonous
and carcinogenic residues in seafood, posing health threats to consumers.”249 When the European
Union, Japan and the United States have partially or completely refused imports of Chinese fish
in 2007, after finding traces of illegal drugs, the fish farmers stopped using the medicine.250
However, many farmers had to see their subsistence threatened as their incomes declined due to
“a 30 percent decline in survival rates of their fish and other seafood.”251
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The legislative response to environmental degradation has been considerable.252 The NPC
has enacted numerous environmental laws and regulations in the past several decades.253
However, as with the FSL, the effectiveness of the environmental laws and regulations is
reduced by improper adherence and enforcement.254 As a result, China’s environment continues
to deteriorate.255
China’s water and soil pollution “are so prevalent that the nation’s farm productivity, its
economy, and the people’s health are at risk as modernization, urbanization, and food demand
are steadily increasing.”256 China’s strong emphasis on economic growth, coupled with
ineffective enforcement of environmental laws and regulations, has led to severe environmental
degradation and has caused problems for the Chinese food industry, harming the country’s
economy.257 Chinese experts have stressed that their government needs to refocus its economic
development agenda and adjust its policies in light of the country’s growing environmental
decay.258 The FSL imposes stricter national food safety standards, yet it completely ignores the
reality of China’s environmental deterioration. There are no provisions in the FSL focusing on
how food safety laws can be implemented and enforced if, for instance, the farmers are forced to
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irrigate their harvest with or raise their stocks of fish in contaminated water. Accordingly,
China’s environmental pollution poses a sizable challenge for the government in enforcing the
laws on food safety.
IV.

Conclusion

As the second largest economy in the world, China has the responsibility to its own
people and to the world community to work out a comprehensive food safety plan. The FSL
represents a significant legislative commitment toward ensuring uniform national food safety
standards, and creating a new governmental body dedicated to food safety oversight and
enforcement. The FSL also imposes harsher penalties for food producers, traders and
government officials, who are directly responsible for food safety violations.
However, the FSL has significant limitations that fail to fully address the root causes of
China’s food safety. First, the law allows the local governments and various food industries to
develop their own food safety standards, which aggravates the existing problem of inconsistent
and duplicative standards on food safety. Second, the law also does not make an effort to
consolidate the various executive agencies under the State Council, which are a direct source of
regulatory loopholes. And third, the FSL does not adequately deter food producers, traders and
government officials from engaging in illegal food practices.
Moreover, the success of the FSL appears to be thwarted by various enforcement
obstacles. First, the problem of local protectionism appears to be so pervasive in China’s
governmental structure that it seems impossible to tackle the problem without major institutional
changes. The central government has to address the problem of accountability to ensure that the
officials are acting in the best interest of their communities and do not exploit their official and
powerful positions for personal gains. Second, China must improve its problems with corruption
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and unscrupulous practices. There is a great need for China to ensure that its laws are applied and
enforced consistently to enhance the deterrence effect. Finally, the central government in Beijing
must refocus its economic growth plan in light of the country’s environmental degradation, and
ensure an effective implementation and enforcement of its environmental laws. In the end, the
safety of China’s food can only be achieved if the ecological conditions are dramatically
improved.
Ensuring food safety is not an easy task for a country of billion people that rose, in only
three decades, to one of the most powerful nations in the world. However, to maintain and
strengthen its economic muscle, China must address crucial domestic deficiencies including
major problems in its food sector.
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